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DCI/IC-75-3940 3 November 1975

Members of the Action Plan Task Group MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT

"Issues and Answers" Paper on Role and

Functions of Senior U.S. Foreign

Intelligence Officer

- 1. Reference is our meeting of 31 October, at which it was reported Mr. Colby's comments had been received on the initial draft of the paper cited in the subject above.
- The paper has been redrafted to respond to Mr. Colby's 2. comments.
- Consideration of this paper will be an agenda item at our meeting at 1500 hours, Tuesday, 4 November. I am particularly interested in whether you identify any additional elements and alternatives of significance for addition to the tabulation.

A Samuer v. WIISOn Lieutenant General, USA Chairman, Action Plan Task Group

Attachment: as stated STAT

ISSUES AND ANSWERS: ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SENIOR U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

ISSUE

1. What should be the role and position of the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer? What key organizational factors and management or other responsibilities will make this officer most effective?

POSITION OF SELECT COMMITTEES

2. The Senate and House Select Committees have not yet held hearings which relate to this paper. Individual staff members of both committees appear to favor a stronger role for the DCI, especially in fiscal matters.

DISCUSSION

- 3. Analyses approaching book-length have been written on various aspects of the problem posed by this issue. The approach taken in this paper is to omit detailed analysis or debate on the pros and cons of various alternatives. Instead, focus is put on the identification of the basic elements of the problem and feasible alternatives within each element.
- 4. The result has been development of the attached tabulation organized as follows:

| Element | No. Alternatives | Type Identifier |
|--|------------------|-----------------|
| Position in Executive Branch Hierarchy | 4 | I-IV |
| Relation to National Security Council Operational Responsibilities | D Li | A-F 1-4 |
| Fiscal Responsibilities | 4 | a-d |
| Responsibilities for Guidance re Information | | |
| Requirements | 6 | (1)-(6) |
| Responsibilities for Production of National | li . | () () |
| Intelligence | 4 | (a)-(d) |
| Responsibilities re Covert Action | 5 | 15. |
| Inspector General Role | 3 | ac. |
| Relations with the Congress | 3 | 17-37 |
| Relation to the USIB and IRAC | 5 | a/-e/ |

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5. From the tabulation, many thousands of possible combinations of roles and functions can be identified, each differing from the other in at least one of the alternatives listed.

RECOMMENDATION

6. It is recognized that agreement on a set of alternatives which the DCI should support will require considerable study and discussion, both within the Executive Branch and, as appropriate, with Committees of the Congress. As basis for such study and discussion, it is recommended that the DCI approve the concept of a senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer identified from the attached tabulation by the following symbols:

III B 2 a (3) (b) 3. c. 1./ a./

- 7. This formula translates into the following description of the proposed role and functions of the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer:
 - III. Director of Central Intelligence (or other appropriate title) who serves as operational head of the central intelligence organization and as the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer, but is not a member of internal White House Staff organization.

(This would be a continuation of the present position of the DCI, but with enhanced responsibilities, as indicated below.)

- B. Intelligence Advisor to the NSC and chairman of the NSC Intelligence Committee.
- 2. Serves as the operating head of the CIA, and as the Executive Agent of the Government for the overall management and direction of the NSA and the NRO.
- a. Develops, reviews and approves budgets for the CIA, NSA and NRO and prepares recommendations concerning the budgets of other Intelligence Community organizations. Is responsible for maximum national-departmental interaction in development of his fiscal program. Submits the overall intelligence budget to the President; through OMB. Defends before Congress the President; budget for the Intelligence Community.

(This would remove approval of the NSA and NRO budgets from the Defense Department.)

- (3) Develops and issues guidance concerning information requirements for national intelligence; reviews the adequacy with which collection requirements developed by all elements of the Community reflect his guidance, and makes recommendations as to necessary improvements.
- (b) Is responsible to the President for approving all national intelligence products and for the evaluation of the quality and responsiveness of such products to national needs, but shares the actual production responsibilities with other agencies.

(This assumes the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is also the operating head of the CIA, which retains its present production responsibilities.)

- 3. Serves as a member of the 40 Committee (or its equivalent), participates in the review of covert action proposals, and is responsible for the conduct of covert actions as the Director of the CIA.
- c. Has no Community-wide Inspector General role.
- 1./ Is the chief spokesman before Congress for the Intelligence Community, including defense of the President's budget for intelligence activities and for provision of national intelligence products to the Congress in a manner worked out with the Congress and its Committees.
- a./ Serves as chairman of both the USIB and the IRAC, with these bodies continuing to have their present responsibilities.

(This assumes the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is responsible both for national intelligence products and for preparation of the NFIP.)

PROPOSED ACTION

8. It is recommended that the role and functions of the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer as outlined in paragraphs 6 and 7 above be used as the basis for:

- a. Discussions within the White House on the Administration position with respect to forthcoming legislation and/or Executive Orders;
- b. Presentations by Executive Branch officials to the Senate and House Select Committees;
- c. Public statements by influential friends and supporters of a strong U.S. foreign intelligence program;
- d. Private discussion, as appropriate, with Senators and Congressmen who are interested in preserving a strong U.S. foreign intelligence capability.

Samuel V. Wilson Lieutenant General, USA Chairman, Action Plan Task Group

Attachment: as stated

TABULATION OF BASIC ELEMENTS AND RELATED ALTERNATIVES WHICH DEFINE POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SENIOR U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Position in Executive Branch Hierarchy


- I. Special Assistant to the President (or other appropriate title) on the White House Staff
- II. Secretary of a Department of National Intelligence with Cabinet status
- III. Director of Central Intelligence (or other appropriate title) who serves as operating head of the central intelligence organization and as senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer, but is not a member of the internal White House Staff organization. (This would be a continuation of the present position of the DCI.)
 - IV. The concept of a senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is abandoned. (The DCI, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense would each serve as intelligence advisors to the President within their present spheres of operational responsibility.)

Relation to the National Security Council

- A. Full member of the NSC and chairman of the NSC Intelligence Committee.
- B. Intelligence Advisor to the NSC and chairman of the NSC Intelligence Committee.
- C. Advisor to the NSC and member of the NSCIC and other NSC committees/groups. (The current role of the DCI.)
- D. Advisor to the NSC, but not a member of the NSCIC.
- E. Member of the NSCIC, but not a participant in NSC sessions.
- F. No direct contact with the NSC or its committees/groups.

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Operational Responsibilities

- 1. Serves as the Executive Agent of the Government for the overall management and direction of all major national intelligence collection programs—but not as the operating head of any of them. (The Secretary of Defense would no longer be Executive Agent for the NSA and NRO programs. The Senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer would not be the operating director of CIA.)
- 2. Serves as the operating head of the CIA, and as the Executive Agent of the Government for the overall management and direction of the NSA and the NRO.
- 3. Serves as the operating head of the CIA, but has no Executive Agent or other operational responsibilities for any other national program.
- 4. None. (The senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer would have no operating or Executive Agent responsibilities, and the Director of the CIA would be a separate official.)

Fiscal Responsibilities

- a. Develops, reviews and approves budgets for the CIA, NSA and NRO and prepares recommendations concerning the budgets of other Intelligence Community organizations. (This would remove approval of the NSA and NRO budgets from the Defense Department.) Is responsible for maximum national-departmental interaction in development of his fiscal program. Submits the overall intelligence budget to the President through OMB. Defends before Congress the President's budget for the Intelligence Community.
- b. Reviews and approves budgets for all elements of the national intelligence program. (This would leave development of program budgets as a departmental or agency responsibility as at present—the new factor being that approval by the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer would be required.) Submits the overall intelligence budget to the President, through OMB. Defends before Congress the President's budget for the Intelligence Community.
- c. Reviews and forwards to the President, through OMB, his recommendations concerning the overall national foreign intelligence program for those elements of the program for which he does not have operating responsibility, and is responsible for maximum national-departmental interaction in development of the program recommendations. (This would be a continuation of the present DCI role as regards the NFIP, since he now approves the CIA budget and makes recommendations concerning other elements of the NFIP.)

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Departmental proposals would not require approval of the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer.

d. None. (The concept of an NFIP would be abandoned.)

Responsibilities Concerning Requirements for Intelligence Information

- (1) Develops, approves and issues all requirements for the collection of national intelligence information for all major collection systems—SIGINT, imagery and human source.
- (2) Develops and issues guidance concerning information requirements for national intelligence.
- (3) Develops and issues guidance concerning information requirements for national intelligence; reviews the adequacy with which collection requirements developed by all elements of the Community reflect his guidance, and makes recommendations as to necessary improvements.
- (4) Conducts a continuing detailed review of specific intelligence collection requirements as developed by various elements of the Community, assesses completeness of the requirements lists with respect to national intelligence needs, and submits recommendations for additions or deletions to the managers of collection activities.
- (5) Reviews and evaluates the effectiveness and adequacy of the procedures used within various elements of the Intelligence Community for the development and approval of collection requirements.
 - (6) None.

Responsibilities for Production of National Intelligence

- (a) Has sole responsibility for the production of national intelligence and is the operating head of the production organization.
- (b) Is responsible to the President for approving all national intelligence products, and for the evaluation of the quality and responsiveness of such products to national needs, but shares the actual production responsibilities with other agencies. (This assumes the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is also the operating head of the CIA, which retains its present production responsibilities.)

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- (c) Has no production responsibilities, but is responsible for providing guidance to the Intelligence Community as to intelligence needs and priorities, and for the review and evaluation of the resulting national intelligence products.
 - (d) None.

Responsibilities for Covert Action

- 1. Heads the 40 Committee (or its equivalent) and develops recommendations for Presidential approval/disapproval of covert action proposals, but has no operational role in direction of covert actions.
- 2. Serves as a member of the 40 Committee (or its equivalent) and participates in review of covert action proposals, but has no role in directing conduct of covert actions.
- 3. Serves as a member of the 40 Committee (or its equivalent), participates in the review of covert action proposals, and is responsible for the conduct of covert actions as the Director of the CIA.
- 4. Serves as a member of the 40 Committee (or its equivalent), participates in the review of covert action proposals, and is the operating head of a special covert action organization separated from the CIA.
 - 5. None.

Inspector General Role

- a. Supported by his own IG Staff, is responsible for the conduct of such investigations as he considers appropriate, including those which will assure all organizations involved in foreign intelligence are complying with legislative and Executive Order restrictions on their activities, particularly as regards the rights of U.S. citizens. Provides the President with periodic reports for forwarding to the Congress.
- <u>b.</u> Conduct no inspections, but be provided copies of reports prepared by the Inspectors General of the separate intelligence organizations. Based on his review of these documents, provide the President with periodic reports for forwarding to the Congress.
 - c. None.

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Relations with the Congress

- 1./ Is the chief spokesman before Congress for the Intelligence Community, including defense of the President's budget for intelligence activities and the provision of national intelligence products to the Congress in a manner worked out with the Congress and its Committees.
- 2./ Is the chief spokesman before Congress for the Intelligence Community on budget matters, but has no role with respect to the provision of substantive national intelligence to the Congress.
- 3./ Provides to the Congress only such information as the Congress may from time-to-time request; has no initiative responsibilities.

Relation to the USIB and the IRAC

- a./ Serves as chairman of both the USIB and the IRAC, with these bodies continuing to have their present responsibilities. (This assumes the senior U.S. forcign intelligence officer is responsible both for national intelligence products and for preparation of the NFIP.)
- b./ USIB and IRAC would be abolished, and the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer charged to develop proposals for whatever advisory boards he considers are needed for his support.
- c./ Serves as chairman of USIB, but has no relation to IRAC. (This assumes the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is responsible for national intelligence production, but not for preparation of the NFIP.)
- d./ Serves as chairman of IRAC, but has no relation to USIB. (This assumes the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is responsible for the NFIP, but has no intelligence production responsibilities.)
- e./ None. (USIB continues to exist as advisory to the officer responsible for the production of national intelligence. IRAC's continued existence would depend on the allocation of responsibility for preparation of the NFIP.)